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RESEARCH & DEBATE

THE UNVARNISHED TRUTH THE DEBATE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION

Rear Admiral William L. Schachte, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)

The Senate’s consideration in 2007 of U.S. accession to the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea has elicited, as it did when the Senate last considered the Convention in 2004, an amazing array of opposition arguments. As
happened four years ago, critics predict near-apocalyptic doom for the United
States if it accedes to the Law of the Sea Convention. In particular, they argue
that the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention will cripple the U.S. Navy’s ability to
perform maritime missions necessary for national security, including collecting
intelligence, conducting submerged transits with submarines, and preventing
actions by terrorists. I feel compelled to speak out, as I did then, against these
misguided and incorrect beliefs and to set the record straight.
The Convention’s opponents were successful in preventing a floor vote in 2004,
during the second session of the 108th Congress. It was almost unprecedented
that a treaty unanimously reported out of committee had failed to go to the full
Senate for a vote. As the 110th Senate considers the Convention, a number of
items have appeared in the press and online asserting
Admiral Schachte served in many capacities related to
1
ocean policy during his thirty-year naval career. In adthat the Convention is contrary to American interests.
dition to being a member of the U.S. delegation to the
Nevertheless, on 31 October 2007 the Senate Foreign
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea negoRelations Committee voted seventeen to four in favor
tiations during the Reagan administration, he served as
2
the Acting Judge Advocate General of the Navy, the Deof ratifying the treaty. Its report has now been sent to
partment of Defense Representative for Ocean Policy
the full Senate for consideration. This time, it is exAffairs, and the Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate Genpected to be voted on.
eral (International Law). As a line officer, he was a
Vietnam volunteer and served in combat (in Swift
The strongest supporters of the Convention are
boats) from January to December 1968.
3
those directly affected by it. The arguments made by
Convention opponents and the administration’s
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rebuttals during the 108th Senate’s consideration of the Convention appear in
the written statements of Legal Advisor William H. Taft before the Senate Armed
4
Services Committee on 8 April 2004; before the House Committee on Interna5
tional Relations on 12 May 2004; and before the Senate Select Committee on In6
telligence on 8 June 2004. They appear also in testimony by Assistant Secretary
of State John Turner before the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations on 21
October 2003 and before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
7
Works on 23 March 2004. In 2007, testimony in support of the Convention was
provided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Deputy Secretary of
State John Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, and Ad8
miral Patrick Walsh, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. The chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, during his confirmation hearings
before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on 31 July 2007, stated un9
equivocally that the Convention advances U.S. interests.
The following is a sampling of the myths regarding the Convention that opponents continue to trumpet.
10
President Reagan thought the treaty was irremediably defective. This is absolutely false. President Reagan expressed concerns only about Part XI’s deep sea11
bed mining regime. In fact, he believed that Part XI could be rectified and
12
specifically identified the elements in need of revision. The regime has been in
fact been fixed, and in a legally binding manner—the 1994 Agreement on Implementation of the Seabed Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea—that
13
addresses each of the American objections to the earlier regime. The rest of the
treaty was considered so favorable to U.S. interests that in his 1983 Ocean Policy
Statement President Reagan ordered the government to abide by and exercise
14
the rights accorded by the non-deep-seabed provisions of the Convention.
U.S. adherence to the Convention is not necessary because navigational freedoms
are not threatened (and the only guarantee of free passage on the seas is the power of
15
the U.S. Navy). But our navigational freedoms are indeed threatened. There are
currently more than a hundred illegal, excessive claims affecting vital navigational and overflight rights and freedoms. The United States has utilized diplomatic and operational challenges to resist the excessive maritime claims of other
countries that interfere with U.S. navigational rights as reflected in the Convention. But these operations entail a certain amount of risk—for example, the
Black Sea bumping incident with the former Soviet Union in 1988. Being a party
to the Convention would significantly enhance our efforts to roll back these
claims by, among other things, putting the United States in a far stronger position to assert its rights and affording additional methods of resolving conflict.
The Convention was drafted before—and without regard to—the war on terror
16
and what the United States must do to wage it successfully. This is an irrelevant
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canard. It is true that the Convention was drafted before the war on terror. However, it enhances rather than undermines our ability to wage the war on terror.
The robust maritime naval and air mobility assured by the Convention is essential for our military forces to operate effectively. The Convention provides the
necessary stability and framework for U.S. forces, weapons, and materiel to get
to the fight without hindrance—and ensures that they will not be hindered in
the future.
Thus, the Convention supports the war on terror by providing important stability for navigational freedoms and overflight. It preserves the right of the U.S.
military to use the world’s oceans to meet national security requirements. It is
essential that key sea and air lanes remain open as an international legal right
and not as a matter of approval from nations along the routes. A stable legal regime for the world’s oceans will support global mobility for our armed forces.
Obligatory technology transfers will equip actual or potential adversaries with
sensitive and militarily useful equipment and know-how (such as antisubmarine
17
warfare technology). In fact, no technology transfers are required by the Convention. Mandatory technology transfers were eliminated by section 5 of the annex to the 1994 Agreement amending Part XI of the Convention. Further, Article
302 of the Convention explicitly provides that nothing in the Convention requires a party to release information the disclosure of which is contrary to the
essential interests of its security.
As a nonparty, the United States is allowed to search any ship that enters our exclusive economic zone to determine whether it could harm the United States or pollute
the marine environment. Under the Convention, the U.S. Coast Guard or others
would not be able to search any ship until the United Nations is notified and approves
18
the right to search the ship. This also is not correct. Under applicable treaty
law—the 1958 conventions on the law of the sea—as well as customary international law, no nation has the right arbitrarily to search any ship that enters its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to determine whether it could harm that nation or
pollute its marine environment. Nor would the United States want countries to
have such a blanket “right,” because it would fundamentally undermine freedom
of navigation, which benefits the United States more than any other nation.
Thus, the descriptions of both the status quo and the Convention’s provisions
are incorrect. It makes no change in our existing ability or authority to search
ships entering the American EEZ with regard to security or protection of the environment. One final and very important point is that under the Convention the
UN has absolutely no role in U.S. military operations, including a decision as to
when and where a foreign ship may be boarded.
Other parties will reject the U.S. “military activities” declaration as a reservation.19 Another false assertion—the American declaration is consistent with the
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Convention and is not a reservation (that is, in international legal usage, “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing,
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their ap20
plication to that State.”) It is an option explicitly provided by article 298 of the
Convention. Parties to the Convention that have already made such declarations
exercising this option include the United Kingdom, Russia, France, Canada,
Mexico, Argentina, Portugal, Denmark, Ukraine, Norway, and China.
The 1994 Agreement does not even pretend to amend the Convention; it merely
21
establishes controlling interpretive provisions. This is nonsensical. The Convention could only have been formally “amended” if it had already entered into
force. The 1994 Agreement was negotiated separately to ensure that the Convention did not enter into force with Part XI in its flawed state. The 1994 Agreement
made explicit, legally binding changes to the Convention and has the same legal
22
effect as if it were an amendment to the instrument itself.
A letter signed by all living former legal advisers to the U.S. Department of
State, representing both Republican and Democratic administrations, confirms
the legally binding nature of the changes to the Convention effected by the 1994
Agreement. Their letter states, “The Reagan Administration’s objection to the
LOS Convention, as expressed in 1982 and 1983, was limited to the deep seabed
mining regime. The 1994 Implementing Agreement that revised this regime, in
our opinion, satisfactorily resolved that objection and has binding legal effect in
23
its modification of the LOS Convention.”
The problems identified by President Reagan in 1983 were not remedied by the
24
1994 Agreement relating to deep seabed mining. Not true—in fact, each objection has been addressed. Among other things, the 1994 Agreement:

• Provides for access by American industry to deep seabed minerals on the
basis of nondiscriminatory and reasonable terms and conditions

25

• Overhauls the decision-making rules to accord the United States critical influence, including veto power over the most important future decisions
that would affect U.S. interests and, in other cases, requires two-thirds majorities that will enable the United States to protect its interests by putting
26
together small blocking minorities

• Restructures the regime to comport with free market principles, including
the elimination of the earlier mandatory technology transfer provisions
27
and all production controls.
28

The Convention gives the UN its first opportunity to levy taxes. This is not at all
the case. The Convention does not provide for or authorize taxation of individuals
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or corporations. It does include, in article 82, revenue-sharing provisions for oil
and gas activities on the continental shelf beyond two hundred miles and admin29
istrative fees for deep seabed mining operations. The costs are less than the royalties paid to foreign countries for drilling off their coasts, and none of the revenues
go to the UN. These minimal costs are worth it, according to reliable industry representatives. (American companies applying for deep seabed mining licenses
would pay application fees directly to the International Seabed Authority (ISA);
no implementing legislation would be necessary.) There would be no expenditure
of revenues by the UN. With respect to deep seabed mining, because the United
States is a nonparty, American companies currently cannot engage in such mining
under U.S. authority. Becoming a party will give U.S. firms that ability and will
open up new revenue opportunities for them when deep seabed mining becomes
economically viable. The alternative is no deep seabed mining for American firms,
except through other nations under the Convention.
30
The Convention mandates another tribunal to adjudicate disputes. That is a
wildly inaccurate portrayal of the authority of the tribunal. The Convention established the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. However, parties are
free to choose other methods of dispute settlement. The United States would
choose two forms of arbitration rather than the tribunal.
The United States would be subject to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber if deep
seabed mining ever takes place. The proposed Senate Resolution of Advice and
Consent makes clear that the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber’s decisions “shall be
enforceable in the territory of the United States only in accordance with procedures established by implementing legislation and that such procedures shall be
subject to such legal and factual review as is constitutionally required and with31
out precedential effect in any court of the United States.” The chamber’s authority extends only to disputes involving the mining of minerals from the deep
seabed; no other activities, whether in the water column or on the surface of the
oceans, are subject to it.
U.S. adherence will entail history’s biggest voluntary transfer of wealth and sur32
render of sovereignty. Actually, the Convention not only enhances the sovereign
operation of military ships and aircraft but also bolsters resource jurisdiction
over a vast area off the coasts of the United States. Furthermore, under the Convention, as superseded by the 1994 Agreement, there is absolutely no transfer of
wealth or surrender of sovereignty.
The Convention supports the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the United
States over extensive maritime territory and natural resources off its coast, including a broad continental shelf that in many areas extends well beyond the
two-hundred-nautical-mile limit, and would give it additional capacity to defend those claims against others. The mandatory technology-transfer provisions
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of the original Convention, to which the United States objected, were eliminated
in the 1994 Agreement.
The International Seabed Authority has the power to regulate seven-tenths of the
33
earth’s surface, impose international taxes, etc. Nothing could be farther from
the truth. The Convention addresses seven-tenths of the earth’s surface. However, the International Seabed Authority does not. The ISA is strictly limited to
administering mining of minerals in areas of the deep seabed beyond national
jurisdiction, generally more than two hundred miles from the shore of any
country. At present such deep seabed mining is economically unfeasible, and it
will remain so for the foreseeable future. The ISA has no other role and has no
general regulatory authority over the uses of the oceans, including freedom of
navigation and overflight. The ISA has no authority or ability to levy taxes.
34
The United States might end up without a vote in the ISA. That would be impossible. The United States would have a permanent seat on the ISA Council, its
main decision-making body, by virtue of its being the state with the largest
economy in terms of gross domestic product on the date of entry into force of
35
the Convention, 16 November 1994. This would give the country a uniquely
influential role on the council, the body that matters most.
The People’s Republic of China asserts that the Convention entitles it to exclusive
economic control of the waters within a two-hundred-nautical-mile radius of its
artificial islands—including waters transited by the vast majority of Japanese and
36
American oil tankers en route to and from the Persian Gulf. That is untrue, as to
both fact and law. The U.S. government is not aware of any claims by China to a
two-hundred-mile economic zone around its artificial islands. Any claim that
artificial islands generate a territorial sea or EEZ would be illegal under the Convention. The Convention specifically provides that artificial islands do not have
37
the status of islands and have no territorial seas or EEZs of their own.
Participation in the Law of the Sea Convention would render the Proliferation
38
Security Initiative invalid. This is not only wrong but something of a reflection
upon the nation’s military leadership, which strongly supports the Convention.
U.S. accession would in no way hinder our efforts under the PSI to interdict vessels suspected of engaging in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The PSI Statement of Interdiction principles requires participating countries to
act in ways consistent with national legal authorities and “relevant international
law and frameworks,” which includes the law reflected in the Convention.
Misunderstandings and misrepresentations are still in circulation. However, the
outlook for Senate ratification is optimistic. The recent favorable vote of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, direct support in writing from the president, support of the Democratic side of the aisle, and support from key

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss2/12

6

Schachte: Research & Debate—The Unvarnished Truth: The Debate on the Law of
SCHACHTE

125

Republican senators like Richard Lugar, Ted Stevens, John Warner, and others
tell me that the Convention will get to the Senate floor and receive the necessary
votes for advice and consent. Thus my prediction: the United States will finally
join the current 155 parties to the Convention. That brings us, however, to a final, fundamental, and cautionary point. Be the United States a party or
nonparty, a robust freedom-of-navigation program must be an essential part of
its oceans policy. This treaty, or any treaty, can be effective only if it is implemented by action.
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